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1 Introduction
Quantum field theories (QFTs) seem to have all of the qualities that typically
motivative scientific realism. Alongside general relativity, the standard model of
particle physics, and its subsidiaries, like quantum electrodynamics (QED) and
quantum chromodynamics (QCD), are our most fundamental physical theories.
They have also produced some of the most accurate predictions in the history
of science: QED famously gives a value for the anomalous magnetic moment of
the electron that agrees with experiment at precisions better than one part in a
trillion. When it comes to actually articulating a realist reading of these theories,
however, we run into serious difficulties.
This chapter puts forward what I take to be the most promising strategy for devel-
oping a realist epistemology in this context. I set up the discussion by highlighting
the difficulty of making sense of QFT in orthodox realist terms if we restrict our
attention to perturbative and axiomatic treatments of the theory (section 2). I
then introduce the renormalization group (section 3), and argue, drawing on pre-
vious work by Wallace (2006, 2011) and Williams (2017), that it points to a way
of rescuing a realist reading of QFT (section 4). I close by considering some chal-
lenges facing this renormalization group based realism (section 5). Besides some
brief remarks in this final section, I will mostly be bracketing the measurement
problem and associated interpretive puzzles about the physical content of quantum
theories.
2 Realism and Quantum Field Theory: A First Look
Scientific realists disagree about how their position should be formulated in detail.
We can discern some general ideas that lie behind many of these statements of
the realist creed, however. Two, in particular, will be my focus here. The first
is an explanatory thesis: realists take the empirical success of the sciences to be
explained by the fact that they are getting something right about the way the
world is. This contrasts with the anti-realist, who either denies that the empiri-
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cal success of science stands in need of explanation, or else adopts an alternative
explanatory strategy that does not invoke the representational veracity of our
theories.1 The second idea concerns the epistemic achievements of current scien-
tific theories. Realists typically take at least some extra-empirical beliefs about
the world to be supported by the predictive success of the sciences; that is, they
take science to furnish knowledge of the unobservable. Again, this contrasts with
anti-realist skepticism towards scientific claims about unobservable entities and
properties. The constructive empiricist, for instance, takes an agnostic attitude
towards the extra-empirical content of successful theories.
While these two claims do not strictly imply one another, connections between
them are typically posited. The dominant approach to developing the realist
position in recent decades has been to identify the theoretical claims we ought to
commit ourselves to using an explanatory criterion. Rather than taking successful
theories as a whole to be the locus of realist commitment, this ‘selective’ form of
realism advocates belief in a subset of their descriptive content; namely, those parts
of the theory which essentially contribute to, and therefore explain the success
of, its empirical predictions. This way of cashing out the epistemic achievement
component of realism is explicitly deployed in Psillos’s (1999) and Kitcher’s (2001)
influential discussions of historical theory change, but the basic selectivist intuition
arguably animates many of the other variants of realism put forward in the recent
literature, such as structural realism. On this line of thought rolling out a realist
epistemology across the various branches of science ought to proceed as follows:
start with a theory’s empirical predictions and trace them back to theoretical
claims that underwrite their success; these are the parts of science that constitute
knowledge of the unobservable.
How does this programme fare in the case of QFT? While I will ultimately claim
that there is scope for harmonising QFT with this selective realist scheme, I’ll start
with a more pessimistic reading of the situation. Ignoring advances in renormal-
ization theory since the 1950s, and restricting our attention to the perturbative
and axiomatic approaches to QFT, it is possible to paint a fairly bleak picture of
realism’s prospects in high energy physics.
As has already been mentioned, QFTs are wildly empirically successful. The
problems start when we look at how these predictions are obtained. The most
important source is the perturbative approach to QFT developed by Feynman,
Tomonaga, Schwinger and Dyson in the late 1940s.2 This is where the famous
calculation of the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron, and the bulk of the
standard model predictions currently being tested at the Large Hadron Collider,
come from. I’ll sketch how this formalism works with reference to the φ4 theory,
1Van Fraassen’s (1980, 40) analogy between theory selection and natural selection can perhaps
be read in either of these two ways. See also Saatsi (2015) for a discussion of anti-realist style
explanations of the empirical success of particular theories.
2This is less true today than it was some decades ago. Non-perturbative calculation methods,
especially Monte Carlo simulations in lattice QFT, are becoming increasingly powerful sources
of empirical predictions. A complete epistemological study of high energy physics would need
to look at these methods in detail but I leave this as a project for another time.
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a well-understood model that shares most of the relevant features of the gauge















where φ is a scalar field, m is its associated mass, λ4 is a positive constant pa-
rameterising the strength of the interaction and the integral ranges over Minkoski
space-time. As is the case with realistic QFTs, there is little hope of finding ex-
act solutions of this theory. The perturbative approach aims to get around this
problem by setting up a power series expansion for quantities in an interaction
coupling, in this case, λ4. The coefficients of this series can, in principle, be cal-
culated using what we know about the corresponding exactly solvable free theory
(with λ4 = 0), though increasingly difficult computations are required at each
order. The hope is that, if λ4 is small, the first few terms of the series will provide
an accurate approximation of the behaviour of a weakly interacting model.
This approximation strategy is, of course, ubiquitous in applied mathematics, but
QFT perturbation series have their own peculiarities. As is well known, naively
applying the perturbative method to QFT yields ill-defined results, leading many
to consider abandoning the theory in its early days. Computing the series coeffi-
cients, for both the φ4 theory and more realistic models, requires one to evaluate
integrals over momentum space that diverge in the high momentum, or ultravi-
olet, region.3 In order to get meaningful predictions out of QFT, the so-called
renormalization procedure was devised. This works roughly as follows. First, the
offending integrals are rendered convergent; in the simplest case, this is achieved
by imposing a cutoff—a large but finite upper limit on the momentum integrals.
The expansion parameter is then redefined so as to remove the perturbative coeffi-
cient’s dependence on the cutoff. It turns out to be possible to completely ‘absorb’
the divergent part of the coefficients at each order into a finite number of param-
eters in the action if the theory contains only interaction terms parameterised
by couplings with a zero or positive mass dimension—so-called renormalizable
interactions.4 The φ4 interaction has this property, as do the electroweak and
strong interactions of the standard model. Indeed, during the years the standard
model was being developed renormalizability was often viewed as a necessary con-
dition for taking a theory seriously and was demanded a priori. At the end of
the renormalization process, the cutoff is removed by taking it to infinity. Follow-
ing this recipe produces a series with finite coefficients, and it is truncations of
these renormalized perturbation series which are compared to data gathered from
collider experiments.
3QFT perturbation series can also contain infrared divergences—integrals which blow up in
the region of very low momentum. More generally, the low energy/long distance structure of
QFT models raises distinctive problems of its own, which will not be discussed here.
4A brief note on dimensional analysis in QFT for the uninitiated. High energy physicists
typically work with so-called natural units, which set ~ = c = 1. This has the effect of drastically
simplifying dimensional analysis, such that the dimensionality of any quantity can be expressed
as a power of energy/mass/momentum, known as its mass dimension.
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Despite its extraordinary empirical success, this approach to QFT has long been
seen as conceptually suspect. Some have suggested that the perturbative formal-
ism is insufficiently mathematically rigorous to engage with philosophically, and
even inconsistent owing to its apparent clash with Haag’s theorem. I have argued
in previous work (James Fraser, 2017) that the situation is not quite this bad.
Perturbative QFT is, at least, internally coherent. There is a problem here, how-
ever, which should be especially worrying for the would-be scientific realist. Many
of the manipulations that go into perturbative calculations, and the renormaliza-
tion procedure, in particular, seems to be completely ad hoc. What licenses us
to remove the infinities that appear in naive QFT perturbation series? The best
we can really say within the confines of the perturbative approach itself is that
we have to do this for the series to be well behaved and yield sensible predictions.
But this is a purely instrumental rationale. Furthermore, it doesn’t give us any
reason to think that the resulting renormalized series ought to produce accurate
predictions. The realist, remember, was committed to there being an explanation
for the success of scientific predictions which ultimately rests on the way the world
is. On the face of it at least, perturbative QFT violates this demand.
The prospects of extracting knowledge of the unobservable from the perturbative
formalism also appear to be grim. The root of the perturbative formalism’s ad hoc
character is arguably that it fails to provide a characterization of the mathematical
structure, and descriptive content, of QFT models. I’ll push this point in the
language of the functional, or path integral, approach to quantization here (in
part because it lays the ground for the discussion of the renormalization group in
the next section). The key quantity in this approach is the partition function Z,




Informally, the measure Dφ indicates that a sum is being taken over all possible
configurations of the field (and S is, again, the classical action). Once we have
the partition function of a QFT model we can, in principle at least, derive all
of its physical quantities. More importantly, we can explicitly construct it as a
mathematical object.
It turns out to be very difficult to precisely define this integral for fields that live
on continuous space-times, however. Owing to the infinite number of degrees of
freedom that exist in any space-time region we need to define a measure over
an infinite dimensional space, once again leading to divergences in the ultraviolet
region. In the perturbative treatment of QFT this issue was dodged rather than
solved. In essence, the perturbative method allows us to set up expansions for Z,
and thus for scattering cross sections, without really telling us what it is. The
one strategy that might suggest itself for extracting a definition of the partition
function from the perturbative formalism is to identify it with the sum of the
series, but it turns out that, even after the divergences in the coefficients have been
removed, realistic QFT perturbation series do not converge. In the absence of a
clear characterization of the physical content of QFT, it is hardly surprising that
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we struggle to find justifications for the moves made in perturbative calculations.
But this situation is also clearly bad news for the epistemic achievement component
of realism. How can the empirical success of the standard model possibly support
beliefs about unobservable aspects of reality if we can’t even specify what the
theory is saying about the world?
There is another strand of the QFT programme the realist might turn to here which
does directly address the question of where QFT models live in the mathemati-
cal universe, namely the axiomatic approach to the theory. In the 1950s and 60s
mathematical physicists dissatisfied with the limitations of the perturbative ap-
proach tried to put the theory on a firm non-perturbative footing by writing down
sets of axioms that any relativistic quantum field could reasonably be expected
to satisfy. In fact, two mathematical treatments of QFT came out of this tradi-
tion: one based on the machinery of operator-valued distributions (Streater and
Wightman, 1965) and the other on von Neumann algebras (Haag, 1996; Halvorson,
2007). Mathematically rigorous work in these frameworks succeeded in showing
that one can precisely define path integrals for field configurations that take ar-
bitrarily large momenta, at least in the case of some toy models in space-times
with a reduced number of dimensions. Unfortunately though, the axiomatic tradi-
tion ultimately doesn’t offer much solace to the aspiring realist about high energy
physics. The crucial rub is that, as of yet, neither the standard model nor any
interacting QFT in four-dimensional Minkowski space-time, has been constructed
as a model of these axiomatic systems. While axiomatic treatments of QFT give
us a clear set of theoretical principles, and therefore at least potential targets
for realist commitment the connection with empirical predictions that the realist
needs is missing.
In sum then, both the explanatory and epistemic achievement components of sci-
entific realism seem to run into serious trouble in the QFT context. I should stress
that I don’t take this to be an existential threat to a realist view of science as a
whole. An obvious response to this situation is to weaken the strength of one’s
epistemic commitments in this context, perhaps citing the theoretical immaturity
of the QFT programme. One could admit, for instance, that we cannot yet ex-
plain the success of QFT’s empirical predictions, or make precise claims about the
nature of the unobservable world on their basis while remaining optimistic that
future scientific progress will eventually come up with the goods.5 Furthermore,
some philosophers of science have recently been arguing that realism needs to be
weakened anyway in the face of anti-realist critique. Saatsi (2015, 2016) advances
a position he calls minimal realism which abandons the epistemic achievement
component entirely and focuses instead on a stripped back version of the explana-
tory thesis. The minimal realism is committed to their being an explanation of
the success of current theories in terms of the way they latch onto the world but
admits that we may not be able to say how this story goes in our current epistemic
5Doreen Fraser (2009) can be read as advocating a position like this. According to her, the
axiomatic approach should be viewed as a work in progress that we have good reason to hope
will eventually solve the puzzle surrounding the physical content of the standard model.
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position. This weakened explanatory thesis is clearly compatible with the state of
play in high energy physics as I have just characterized it.
I will be suggesting in what follows, however, that there is scope for rescuing the
traditional explanatory and epistemic achievement theses in the QFT context. The
preceding discussion may be a fair assessment of the situation as it stood before
the 1970s, but developments in renormalization theory open up the possibility of
a more full-blooded realist reading of the theory.
3 The Renormalization Group
In the decades following the invention of the perturbative QFT formalism the
notion of renormalization broadened in scope and ultimately underwent funda-
mental conceptual changes. Fruitful exchange of ideas between condensed matter
and high energy physics culminated in the emergence of the so-called renormaliza-
tion group in the 1970s. Nowadays, renormalization methods enjoy applications in
many areas of physics and beyond, taking on different forms in different theoreti-
cal contexts. I focus here on the incarnation of the renormalization group which
is most significant for the philosophy of QFT: the momentum space approach
developed by Kenneth Wilson.6
The core idea underlying the renormalization group, in all of its guises, is the study
of coarse-graining transformations: operations which take us from an initial system
of interest to a new one that lacks some of the degrees of freedom associated with
high energies and small length scales but shares its large-scale properties. One
reason why renormalization group methods are so diverse is that there are many
ways of implementing a transformation of this kind. One approach employed in
the study of lattice spin systems in statistical physics, for instance, is to replace
groups of neighbouring spins with a single ‘block spin’ degree of freedom and tune
the dynamics of the new system so as to reproduce the same (or, in practice,
similar) macroscopic behaviour (figure 1). In some cases, it may be possible to
invert the transformation, forming a group structure—hence the name. But this
6Wilson and Kogut (1974) being the classic review of this approach.
Figure 1: A ‘majority rule’ blocking procedure on a two valued spin system.
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is not always possible; blocking transformations of the kind just described are
typically not invertible. In any case, group theory seldom plays an important role
in renormalization group methods, so the terminology is always misleading in one
way or another. The real significance of these transformations is that they can be
understood as inducing a ‘flow’ on a space of possible theories. Studying this flow
turns out to be a powerful source of information about the behaviour of physical
systems at different scales.
Rather than working in real space, as in the blocking approach, Wilson pioneered
the idea of implementing a coarse-graining transformation in momentum space.
To see how this works we need to return to the path integral expression for the
partition function, Z. As we already discussed, defining integrals over field config-
urations is a project fraught with difficulty. Wilson’s key insight was that, rather
than considering all configurations at once, we can evaluate the integral in sec-
tions. To get started with this approach we need to explicitly remove from the






We’ll see how this can be rationalised in detail shortly, but for now we can think of
Λ as the energy scale at which new fields, or physics beyond the scope of the QFT
framework entirely comes into play (in the most extreme case this would be the
so-called Planck scale at which quantum gravity effects are expected to become
important). This is somewhat analogous to the cutoff imposed in perturbative
renormalization, but we are now operating in a completely non-perturbative con-
text. What results from this cutoff procedure then is a well defined physical system
that lacks degrees of freedom associated with arbitrarily large momentum, and ar-
bitrarily small length scales. In contrast to the models sought in the axiomatic
approach to QFT, these systems have a finite number of degrees of freedom in any
finite space-time region. I’ll call these structures cutoff QFT models.
The Wilsonian renormalization group sets up a coarse-graining transformation on
these cutoff QFTs as follows. We isolate the contribution to the integral due to
the highest remaining field configurations, whose Fourier transforms have support
above some value µ; this part of the integral is then computed separately and









This defines a transformation that takes us from an initial cutoff QFT model to a
new one, which has a lower cutoff and a modified dynamics but behaves like the
original.
This transformation will not only alter the values of coupling parameters in the
initial action but also give rise to new interaction terms. In general, we need to
consider all possible terms which are not ruled out by initially demanded symme-
tries and constraints, including non-renormalizable interactions. For scalar fields,
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this means going beyond the φ4 theory to a broader class of actions including in-
teractions like: λ6φ
6, λ8φ
8, and so on. The renormalization group transformation
can then be seen as inducing a flow in a space of possible theories, spanned by the
couplings (m, λ4, λ6, ...). The way that these parameters change as µ is lowered,
and more and more high momentum degrees of freedom are ‘integrated out’, is





In most interesting contexts the equations governing the renormalization group
flow are highly non-linear and cannot be exactly solved. Probing them via various
approximation methods, however, has proven to be a powerful tool for answering
many important questions about QFTs.7
What is most significant for the scientific realism debate is how the renormalization
group flow behaves in the low energy regime, far below the cutoff Λ. It turns out
to be possible to say something surprisingly general about this. As µ decreases
the renormalization group flow is thought to be attracted to a finite dimensional
surface spanned by the parameters associated with renormalizable terms in the
action. Polchinski (1984) gives a rigorous demonstration of this behaviour in the
case of scalar field theories by linearising the renormalization group equations in
the region of small couplings. If we do this it is possible to show that variations
in the non-renormalizable couplings at initial cutoff scale Λ are almost completely
absorbed into variations in renormalizable couplings as we coarse-grain to a much
lower scale µ  Λ, up to powers of µ/Λ (figure 2). While this is a somewhat
special result, and rests on the assumption that the couplings are small, this sort
of behaviour is believed to hold generally and apply to realistic theories like QED
and the standard model.
What this means is that QFT models that differ dramatically in their high energy
dynamics manifest very similar physics at lower energies; a phenomenon known
as universality in the physics literature. Basically any scalar field theory will look
like the familiar φ4 model at sufficiently low energies, for instance. This leads to
a new perspective on QFT, and on the cutoff imposed at the beginning of the
renormalization group analysis in particular. The renormalization group results
just discussed demonstrate that removing the high energy degrees of freedom of
a field theory leaves its low energy behaviour more or less unaffected. Since a
model’s low energy physics can be almost completely parameterised by renormal-
izable coupling, all varying the value of Λ (and the details of how it is imposed)
can do is move it around this finite dimensional surface. Fixing the values of
the renormalizable couplings via a finite number of experimental measurements
absorbs almost all of the cutoff dependence of a QFT model’s physical quantities.
Cross sections for scattering events at an energy scale E, for instance, will only de-
pend on the cutoff through powers of E/Λ. The cutoff, then, allows us to bracket
7The renormalization group also turns out to be relevant to the project of constructing QFT
models without cutoffs which satisfy the sets of axioms devised in the axiomatic approach to
QFT, for instance. See Hancox-Li (2015).
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the question of what the world is like at the fundamental level while accurately
modelling its low energy properties.
In the post renormalization group era, QED and the standard model have come
to be regarded as ‘effective field theories’: models that are valid in some limited
energy regime but should not be trusted beyond them. It is this shift in the
outlook and methodology of the QFT programme which opens new paths for the
scientific realist, as I will now argue.
4 Brighter Prospects for Realism
I claim that these advances in renormalization theory have improved the situation
for both of the components of the realist doctrine in the QFT context. Firstly,
the renormalization group framework provides a physical understanding of the
original perturbative renormalization procedure. It thus opens up the possibility
of achieving the sort of explanation of the empirical success of perturbative QFT
the realist seeks. And secondly, it leads to a new perspective on the problem of
characterizing QFT’s physical content and ultimately suggests a way of articu-
lating claims about the world that are supported by the success of the standard
model.
How does the renormalization group help us make sense of perturbative QFT?
One important upshot that has been emphasised in the recent philosophical lit-
erature is that it transforms our understanding of the notion of renormalizability
(Butterfield and Bouatta, 2014). As I mentioned in section 2, renormalizability
was traditionally viewed as a property that any viable QFT model must possess.
There was always something mysterious about this way of thinking, however. Why
should the world be structured in such a way as to be amenable to perturbative
approximation? Without the renormalization group results just described, the
fact that the actions of empirically successful theories are renormalizable would
seem to be a lucky coincidence. We can now see, however, that limiting one’s
attention to renormalizable interaction terms is a very reasonable thing to do. If
Λ is taken to be a very high energy scale at which new physics comes into play,
we should expect physics at currently accessible energies to be very well described
by a renormalizable action, as the effects of non-renormalizable interaction terms
will be heavily suppressed by inverse powers of the cutoff.
This does not quite get to the heart of how the renormalization group illuminates
the perturbative approach, however. After all, the fundamental puzzle about
renormalized perturbation theory was why it produces accurate approximations
at all, even granting the renormalizability of the interactions under considera-
tion. I suggested above that the perturbative approach is incapable of answering
this question on its own because it lacks a cogent characterization of the systems
and quantities it is supposed to be approximating. The renormalization group
framework arguably fills this lacuna, providing a non-perturbative framework that
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can justify the various steps that go into the perturbative renormalization proce-
dure.
The first step of the perturbative renormalization procedure, you will recall, was
to replace the divergent momentum integrals in the perturbative coefficients with
finite cutoff expressions. Since the cutoff is removed at the end of the calculation
this was typically understood in purely formal terms in the original perturbative
treatment of QFT. The renormalization group framework provides a physical in-
terpretation of what is going on here, however. We have seen that it is possible to
simulate the effects of high momentum degrees of freedom not included in a cutoff
model by tuning the system’s dynamics. We can thus legitimize the perturba-
tive cutoff on momentum space integrals in the same terms, on the understanding
that the effects of physics beyond the cutoff can be absorbed into an ‘effective’
action.
The second step of the procedure was to redefine the expansion parameter so as to
remove the diverging dependence on the cutoff in the perturbative coefficients. In
the original incarnation of the renormalization method, this was viewed as a nec-
essary step to extract sensible predictions from the perturbative formalism. The
renormalization group analysis of the low energy regime provides a physical justi-
fication for removing the hypersensitivity to the cutoff, however. We saw that low
energy physical quantities, and in particular, the scattering cross sections that are
typically the targets of perturbative calculations, actually are weakly dependent
on the cutoff at low energies. This amounts to a non-perturbative demonstration
that the logarithms and powers of Λ that appear in naive perturbative expansion
are artefacts of an inappropriate choice of expansion parameter. Once the ex-
pansion parameter has been renormalized in the manner described in the previous
section the only dependence on the cutoff that remains in perturbative approxima-
tions takes the correct form of powers of E/Λ. The perturbative renormalization
procedure, on this reinterpretation, is fundamentally about ensuring that our ap-
proximations have the right scaling behaviour, not about ensuring that they are
mathematically well behaved as the cutoff is removed. Choosing the expansion
parameter so as to minimize the dependence on the cutoff can simply be under-
stood as a matter of ensuring that truncations of the series mimic the behaviour
of the physical quantity that they are supposed to approximate.
The final step of taking the cutoff to infinity also finds a natural justification in
the renormalization group setting. Assuming that the cutoff scale is much higher
than the energy scale we are trying to describe, the E/Λ cutoff dependence of
renormalized perturbative approximations, and the actual physical quantities they
are supposed to approximate, will be very small. In many contexts, they will be
much smaller than expected experimental error and can consequently be justifiably
ignored. What we are doing when we take the cutoff to infinity in perturbative
calculations is neglecting the residual dependence on the cutoff. Since removing
the cutoff in the perturbative context has significant computational benefits, and
the renormalization group gives us a handle on the kind of errors that result from
doing so, it is pragmatically justified.
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This is only a sketch of how the renormalization group illuminates the original
perturbative QFT formalism and more work is clearly needed to develop this
story in detail.8 Still, the pieces seem to be in place to explain the success of
perturbative predictions in terms which should satisfy the realist. We also find
ourselves in a better position regarding the epistemic achievement component of
realism in the post renormalization group context. The shift towards an effective
field theory perspective on QFT points to a way of extracting knowledge of the
unobservable from empirically successful QFT models.
The central problem here was the lack of a clear answer to the question of what em-
pirically successful QFTs are—both mathematically and physically. We saw in the
previous section, however, that it is possible to precisely define the path integral
for the partition function and explicitly construct realistic QFTs as mathematical
models if the degrees of freedom of the field associated with arbitrarily large en-
ergies and momenta are removed via the cutoff. This provides a non-perturbative
characterization of QFT which has a crucial advantage over the axiomatic systems
discussed in section 2; we can explicitly write down cutoff formulations of empir-
ically successful QFTs, and the standard model in particular. Furthermore, we
have seen good reasons to regard these cutoff models as conceptually respectable,
and empirically successful, theories in their own right. As Wallace (2006, 2011)
has argued, this suggests that we should be looking to cutoff QFT models when
it comes to the question of what we ought to believe about the world given the
empirical successes of high energy physics.9
What would it mean exactly to be realist about a cutoff QFT? Following Williams
(2017), we can make sense of this along the lines of the selective realist programme
introduced in section 2. The basic idea behind this approach was that the realist
ought to take a differentiated attitude towards the content of a successful theory,
saving their optimism for those theory constituents that underwrite its predictive
success. The renormalization group comes into its own again here, providing a
powerful tool for developing this sort of selective realist reading of a QFT.
On the one hand, it allows us to identify features of cutoff QFT models that we
should not take representationally seriously. Much of the empirical success of the
standard model takes the form of predictions of cross sections for scattering events
8One potential worry here is that, since perturbation theory itself is often used to analyse the
renormalization group flow—and the Polchinski results mentioned in the previous section turns
on a small coupling assumption—there is a danger of circularity in appealing to the renormaliza-
tion group to rationalize the perturbative formalism. I think this objection can be rebutted, but
discussing this point in detail is beyond the scope of this chapter. Thanks to Laura Ruetsche
for raising this issue.
9Taking cutoff models to provide an adequate characterization of the mathematical and phys-
ical content of QFT is controversial. Doreen Fraser (2011), in particular, has argued against this
move and defended the superiority of axiomatic formulations of the theory. Note, however, that
taking cutoff QFTs to be appropriate objects of realist commitment does not imply that the
axiomatic approach has nothing to offer philosophically. There are arguably other philosoph-
ical issues raised by the QFT programme that are most naturally addressed in the context of
the axiomatic tradition. For more on this pluralist approach to the dispute surrounding the
formulation of QFT see James Fraser (2016).
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produced in particle colliders, with the current energy limit being at the order of
1013 electron volts. The renormalization group results just discussed reveal that
many features of current QFT models do not really make a difference to these
empirical successes, in the sense that they can be varied without much affecting
scattering cross sections at relevant energy scales. For one thing, it establishes
that these quantities are highly insensitive to the imposition of a cutoff at some
much higher energy scale, as well as the details of how this is done. We can also
vary the dynamics of a model at the cutoff scale without affecting its predictions;
adding small non-renormalizable interactions to the standard model action, for
instance, does not undermine its empirical adequacy. What this tells us is that
many of the claims QFT models make about the world at the fundamental level do
not contribute to, and consequently are not supported by, the predictive successes
of modern particle physics.
On the other hand, the renormalization group helps us articulate positive theo-
retical commitments that are supported by the success of the standard model. As
well as sharing empirical content, the classes of QFT models that flow to the same
surface under the action of the renormalization group transformation arguably
make common claims about relatively large scale, non-fundamental, aspects of
the world. They agree, for instance, about low energy correlation functions—
expectation values of products of field operators associated with well-separated
space-time regions. These quantities are preserved by the renormalization group
coarse-graining transformation and encode the long distance structure of a QFT
model. They are also directly connected to its successful predictions—unlike the
theoretical features mention above, you cannot vary the long distance correlation
functions of a theory without drastically affecting its low energy scattering cross
sections. Furthermore, the renormalization group tells us that these quantities are
extremely insensitive to the details of physics at very high, currently inaccessible,
energy scales. It thus demonstrates that they are, at least in one sense of the
term, robust, another quality which selective realists often take to motivate belief
in a theoretical claim (Wimsatt 2007, Williams 2017).
The idea then is that the information the renormalization group provides about
the dependencies that hold between theoretical claims at different scales allows
us to sort those we should take representationally seriously from those we should
not. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that QFTs enjoy a kind of
coarse-grained representational success, capturing some (relatively) long distance,
low energy, features of the world without limning its fundamental structure. This
accords with the effective field theory methodology, but, crucially, the claim that
the standard model is an effective theory is not read as meaning that it is purely
phenomenological. It furnishes genuine extra-empirical knowledge on this view—
just not about the fundamental.
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5 Challenges
Drawing on renormalization group resources in the way I have just outlined is, I
think, our best hope for assimilating QFT into a traditional realist view of sci-
ence. Many questions remain about how this proposal should be fleshed out and
defended, however. In the interest of sharpening the position, or, more accu-
rately, identifying those areas where it needs sharpened, I want to conclude by
addressing some of Laura Ruetsche’s recent objections (Ruetsche, 2018). I will
touch, in particular, on two worries raised by her discussion that point to the
need for further work in an epistemological and metaphysical/semantic direction
respectively.10
The first objection targets my claim at the end of the last section that results
about the low energy behaviour of the renormalization group flow give us grounds
to be confident in some coarse-grained properties of QFT models. The worry is
that this move falls foul of familiar anti-realist arguments concerning historical
theory change. Anti-realists have long pointed to the plethora of predictively suc-
cessful yet false scientific theories in the historical record as a challenge for realism.
A recent incarnation of this sort of argument, which is particularly pertinent in
the present context, is Kyle Stanford’s (2006) problem of unconceived alterna-
tives. When we look at the history of science, according to Stanford, we find
that scientists have repeatedly failed to conceive of rival theories that were just as
well supported by the available empirical evidence as the theories they accepted.
Inductively then, we should expect present scientists, and scientific theories, to be
in the same boat, undermining our confidence in current extra-empirical scientific
claims.
The renormalization group results discussed above might seem to offer respite
from this problem. The standard model will likely someday be replaced by a new
theory that describes the physics of currently inaccessible energy regimes. Since
the low energy features of the standard model are highly insensitive to what is
going on at these higher energy scales, however, one might think that they are
very likely to be retained by these more fundamental theories, whatever they end
up looking like. As Ruetsche points out, however, this line of response rests on the
assumption that future theories can be situated in the space on which the renor-
malization group transformation acts and this is not obvious a priori. Rigorous
renormalization group results, such that there are, deal with rather circumscribed
spaces of theories. Furthermore, the QFT framework itself is expected to break
down and be replaced by a radically new quantum gravity theory as the Planck
scale is approached. Who is to say this theory can be treated within the renormal-
ization group framework? In fact, if we accept the moral of Stanford’s induction,
it seems that we should actively expect future theory change to outstrip the reach
10Another line of objection, which will not be dealt with here, is Doreen Fraser’s (2011) claim
that renormalization group results reveal widespread underdetermination in QFT and therefore
push against realism, rather than coming to its aid. I address this underdetermination worry in
James Fraser (2018).
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of renormalization group considerations.
How to respond? We should concede, I think, that renormalization group results
do not defeat historically generated skepticism on their own.11 Indeed, it is difficult
to see how local scientific arguments could ever sway a thoroughgoing anti-realist
who is already convinced of their unreliability. It is important to distinguish
two tasks facing the scientific realist here, however: spelling out the content of
their epistemology and defending it. This chapter has focused on the former;
I presupposed a realist perspective and advanced a strategy for articulating two
central realist theses in the QFT context. When it comes to the project of arguing
for a realist view of science more general epistemological issues that have not
been touched on here need to be considered, the implications of historical theory
change being prominent among them. A flat-footed response to this sort of attack
then is to admit that the plausibility of the programme set out in this chapter is
conditional on a successful rebuttal of historical arguments for anti-realism.12
Having said that, it is possible that the renormalization group might play some
role in the broader project of defending realism. Here is a different way it might
feature in a response to Stanford’s unconceived alternatives problem, for instance.
One supposed advantage of Stanford’s argument is that, whereas traditional in-
carnations of the pessimistic induction generalise over scientific theories, and are
therefore vulnerable to the response that false historical theories were unlike cur-
rently accepted ones in relevant respects, his induction generalises over scientific
theorists. Stanford suggests that it is more difficult to drive a wedge between the
inferential capacities of past and present scientists—surely current scientists are
no better than luminaries like Darwin and Maxwell at conceiving of relevant alter-
natives to their theories (Stanford, 2006, 43)? One might reject this assumption,
however, claiming that theoretical and methodological progress in the sciences has
improved our ability to probe the space of possible theories. The renormalization
11One might try to resist this conclusion by marshalling further theoretical considerations
which suggests that the renormalization group apparatus can encompass the class of relevant
alternatives to the standard model. We might point, for instance, to Weinberg’s (2004) ‘folk
theorem’, which says that any theory that satisfies some general principles, like cluster decompo-
sition and (approximate) Lorentz invariance, will have to recover the basic theoretical structure
of QFT at low energy scales (see also Duncan, 2012). This suggests that, no matter how radi-
cally novel a future theory of quantum gravity is, its low energy limit should be a QFT that is
amenable to the kind of renormalization group analysis described in section 3. Again though,
this argument rests on a posteriori scientific premises, so unrestrained historically generated
skepticism will also throw it into doubt.
12Godfrey-Smith (2008), Chakravarty (2008), Ruhmkorff (2011) and Devitt (2011) are some
responses to Stanford’s unconceived alternatives problem which the aspiring realist about QFT
might draw on. The strategy mentioned below, of urging that science is improving in its ability
to rule out alternative theories, is suggested in a number of these papers. I should note that, if it
turns out that the epistemic achievement component of realism has to be abandoned in light of
arguments like Stanford’s the renormalization group might still have something to offer a more
minimal realism of the kind advocated by Saati (2015). Saatsi suggests that the most promising
strategy for articulating the realist position is to point to exemplars, from contemporary science
and historical record, of a how a theory’s latching onto the world could explain its empirical
success. We could thus treat the story told in section 4 as an exemplar of this sort without
committing ourselves to its truth.
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group is arguably an instance of this phenomenon. Even if it is not exhaustive
in its scope, the information the renormalization group provides about how mod-
ifications of a theories dynamics at one scale affect its behaviour at others seems
to be a novel epistemological resource that was not available to previous gener-
ations of physicists. While Ruetsche is right to flag the danger of exaggerating
the power and generality of the renormalization group approach then I do not
think her discussion gives us reason to abandon the realist programme advanced
in this chapter. It does point to a need for a more careful examination of the
epistemological milage that can really be extracted from renormalization group
results, however.
The second worry I want to consider concerns the nature of the representational
success allegedly enjoyed by effective field theories. Even granting that some of the
low energy claims of current QFTs are supported by renormalization group consid-
erations, Ruetsche (2018) suggests, it is not obvious that they really concern the
unobservable. This line of attack exploits the fact that renormalization group en-
thusiasts are often rather vague about the features of the world they take effective
field theories to be latching onto. Furthermore, when they do try to make more
explicit commitments they seem to be vulnerable to reinterpretation in empiricist
friendly terms. In the previous section, I identified low energy correlation functions
as plausible examples of the sort of theoretical quantities we ought to be realist
about. But correlation functions are intimately related to scattering cross sections
measured in collider experiments (via the LSZ reduction formula). If correlation
functions can be interpreted as merely encoding information about the empirical
signatures of scattering events measured at collider experiments then the view of
QFT I have been developing threatens to collapse into a form of empiricism.
Again, I do not think this line of objection is fatal, but it does add urgency
to a central challenge facing our realist programme. In order to substantiate
the claim that effective field theories are capturing unobservable aspects of the
world, in accordance with the epistemic achievement thesis, we need a precise
characterization of the non-fundamental descriptive content of QFT models. This
is a difficult problem for, at least, two reasons.
First of all, the status of non-fundamental entities and properties is a controversial
issue in its own right. As Williams (2017) points out, pervasive methodological
assumptions about the nature of the interpretive project have led philosophers of
physics to focus on the fundamental ontology posited by physical theories. As a
result, non-fundamental physical ontology is undertheorized and some may even
doubt that there is such a thing, adding fuel to the suspicions about the realist
credentials of my programme. In philosophy more generally, there is no agreed-
upon framework for regimenting claims about the non-fundamental, with different
approaches gaining currency in different sub-disciplines. Philosophers of science
in the structural realist tradition (Ladyman and Ross, 2007; Wallace, 2012) have
appealed to the Dennetian notion of ‘real patterns’, for instance, while analytical
metaphysics has seen an explosion of interest in notions of metaphysical depen-
dence and grounding (Bliss and Trogdon, 2014). There are certainly frameworks
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on the table that the effective field theory realist might turn to in order to clarify
their position then, but doing so will only be as reassuring as these approaches
are well motivated.13
A second obstacle here is the perennial controversy surrounding the physical con-
tent of quantum theories. I have skirted around the measurement problem thus
far but the would-be realist about QFT clearly cannot put this issue off indefi-
nitely. In order to rebut suggestions that low energy correlation functions have
no extra-empirical content we seem to need a physical interpretation of quantum
operators and states, and different approaches to the measurement problem give
different answers to the question of what the quantum world is basically like.14
Furthermore, in addition to the puzzles inherited from non-relativistic quantum
mechanics, QFT raises interpretive problems of its own. As Ruetsche (2011) ar-
gues detail, the existence of unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations of
a quantum theory with infinitely many degrees of freedom arguably poses a novel
interpretive challenge.15
All this suggests that the realist strategies advanced in this chapter will have to
be re-examined alongside traditional debates about the interpretation of quantum
theory and groundwork on the notions of the fundamental and derivative before
the prospects of realism in high energy physics can be fully assessed.
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